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SYMPOSIUM ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
L. Lynn Hogue*
New occasions leach new duties
Time makes ancient good uncouth.
-James Russell Lowell
And what is Habilitation without Intention and Act?
-Francis Bacon
Patterns in the quest for greater legal rights for the develop-
mentally disabled' have become more difficult to identify. In sharp
contrast to the obvious exuberance of Professor Charles Halpern 2
and Judge David Bazelon,3 who in his prefatory comments for a
* A.B. (1966), William Jewell College; M.A. (1968), Ph.D. (1972), University of Ten-
nessee; J.D. (1974), Duke University. Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University
of Arkansas at Little Rock. Member of the bars of Arkansas and North Carolina.
1. A "developmental disability" is:
a severe, chronic disability of a person which-
(A) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental
and physical impairments;
(B) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two;
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(D) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following
areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (ii) receptive and expressive language,
(iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direction, (vi) capacity for independent living,
and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; and
(E) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special, interdis-
ciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of lifelong or ex-
tended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. III 1979).
2. The next several years will see fascinating doctrinal developments, and in-
terchanges among courts, legislatures, and administrators. The course of these de-
velopments will suggest some of the ways that the legal system does or does not
assure the fair and humane treatment of a helpless minority.
Halpern, Introduction, 31 STAN. L. REV. 545, 551 (1979).
3. This symposium on mental retardation and the law, which focuses on develop-
ments in the civil law context, provides a welcome occasion to reflect on the pro-
gress that has occurred in that field since the Task Force Report [THE PRESIDENT'S
PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW] was
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1979 symposium on mentally retarded people and the law,4 could
discern portents of "fascinating doctrinal developments" and trace
"significant progress" in recent congressional enactments, this intro-
duction must begin on a more cautious footing. Erosion of the legal
basis for many milestones in the rights of the disabled is evident.
For example, the carefully constructed edifice of constitutionalized
rights to treatment and habilitation5 so cogently elaborated by Judge
Frank M. Johnson, Jr.:
When patients are ... committed for treatment purposes they
unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such indi-
issued. It is heartening to look back and realize that we have indeed made signifi-
cant progress in many of the areas enumerated in the 1963 report: Congress has
recently passed legislation to guarantee adequate education for retarded children,
as well as legislation to ensure advocacy services for retarded persons of all ages.
Bazelon, Preface, 31 STAN. L. REV. 541 (1979), citing The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420
(1976)) and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 496 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976)).
4. 31 STAN. L. REV. 541-829 (1979).
5. There is a technical difference between 'treatment,' which applies to curable
mental illness, and 'habilitation,' which consists of education and training for
those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1534 n.2 (1981). See also
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974):
'Treatment' means care provided by mental health professionals and others that is
adequate and appropriate for the needs of the mentally impaired inmate. Treat-
ment also encompasses a humane physical and psychological environment. The
term 'habilitation,' used by the parties and amici in the district court and by the
district court in its order of April 13, 1972 (Partlow State School and Hospital) is a
term used to describe that treatment which is appropriate to the condition of the
mental retardate. For convenience, in this opinion we group 'habilitation' and
'treatment' under the single term 'treatment,' and to include those instances where
rehabilitation is impossible in which event the requirement is minimally adequate
habilitation and care, beyond the subsistence level custodial care that would be
provided in a penitentiary. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.
1974).
See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. 1972), approved sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (app. A(I)(E), MINIMUM CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS FOR ADEQUATE HABILITATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED), defining "ha-
bilitation" as:
[T]he process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and
maintain those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the de-
mands of his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physi-
cal, mental, and social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to
programs offormal, structured education and treatment.
On the right to an habilitation program see id. at 396; on the content of individualized
habilitation plans see id. at 397. Cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modbied, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1531
(1981) (" 'Habilitation' is the term of art used to refer to that education, training and care
required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development.").
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vidual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity
to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition. [Citations
omitted.] Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally re-
quired because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed into
a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no con-
victed offense. * * * The purpose of involuntary hospitalization
for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care
or punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitu-
tional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental insti-
tutions ... 6
had given way under the assaults of O'Connor v. Donaldson.7 The
"Bill of Rights Act"8 for the developmentally disabled was reduced
to the level of "Congressional 'encouragement' of state programs"
by the Pennhurst case.9 Even apart from the subsiding legal plateau,
opposition has emerged to such programs as deinstitutionalization10
and advocacy programs I to insure that the legal rights of the men-
6. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See also Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), approved sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
7. 422 U.S. 563, 578-90 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) and Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1539 n.12 (1981) ("[T]his Court has never found that
the involuntarily committed have a constitutional 'right to treatment,' much less the volunta-
rily committed.") O'Connor apparently approved involuntary commitment for the purpose
of treating a condition even when it poses no risk of danger to the community.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976).
9. 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1544 (1981). Compare Pennhurst with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975): "[Tlhis holding ... penalizes children--children who have the misfortune to
have to cope with the learning process under extraordinarily heavy physical and psychologi-
cal burdens, for the most part congenital." Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring with respect
to the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's textbook loan program but dissenting with respect
to the Court's holding that other aid programs for parochial schools including counseling,
testing, psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, and related services for excep-
tional, remedial, or educationally disadvantaged students were unconstitutional).
10. Frohboese and Sales, Parental Opposition to Deinstitutionalization: A Challenge in
Need of(Attention and Resolution, 4 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1 (1980).
11. Compare Shwed, Social Policy and the Rights of the Mentally Il: Timefor Re-exami-
nation, 5 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 193, 193-94 (1980):
Mental health advocacy has provided a natural niche for socially-minded young
lawyers who have rejected traditional legal career tracks. The vagaries of the job
market for law school graduates have given additional impetus to this new brand
of legal ombudsmanship. However, the reformist zeal of this group is often in
conflict with the clinical realities of psychiatric practice. Acute psychiatric emer-
gencies with suicidal, homicidal, or agitated psychotic potential require rapid med-
ical-psychiatric assessment, treatment and disposition. Cumbersome regulations
protecting the civil liberties of such acutely ill patients paralyze or significantly
impede appropriate, swift treatment.
Although such civil libertarian safeguards may seem thoughtful and reason-
able in the context of a law or medical school seminar, they become obstructive to
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tally impaired are respected. Evidence of a failing consensus on the
proper role of law in the world of the disabled, foreseen by Rosen-
berg and Friedman,' 2 may be emerging. Signs of "progress" are
more difficult to detect.' 3
Recent developments both in litigation and legislation regard-
ing the developmentally disabled suggest that any progress during
the decade of the 80s is likely to be measured in small rather than
large steps. Consonant with this view, the articles which comprise
this Symposium focus on a number of practical issues which are
likely to survive even in a time of retrenchment and hence to have
ongoing utility for practitioners who elect to work in this challeng-
ing and vital area.
Contrasting with the limited holding in Pennhurst, which de-
nies the existence of a Bill of Rights as such incorporating substan-
tive entitlements to which the developmentally disabled could have
laid claim, is the decision in Battle v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania 14 which held that an administrative policy setting a limit of
180 days of instruction per year for all children was incompatible
with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act's 5 emphasis
on individuals and individual education plans. The refusal of the
United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari suggests that the
Act's mandate of "free and appropriate public education"1 6 may en-
joy a more robust life than Congress' effort in the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to spell out a "bill of
'front line' mental health professionals working in a busy hospital emergency room
setting with an acutely disturbed patient and his distraught family.
with Tancredi, The Rights of Mental Patients.: Weighing the Interests, 5 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 199, 203 (1980):
Obviously, the arguments for and against libertarian posture with regard to the
mentally ill are complex. The medical profession is influenced, not only by its
desire to treat those in need of care, but by its own philosophical perspective with
regard to the taxonomy of mental diseases and the implications of this for individ-
ual patient decisions. The legal profession, on the other hand, approaches this
situation from the standpoint of civil rights, and looks to the application of legal
principles to a vulnerable group in society. The mentally ill and retarded are
among the most vulnerable to abuse.
12. Rosenberg and Friedman, Developmental Disability Law: A Look into the Future, 31
STAN. L. REV. 817, 819-22 (1979).
13. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
14. 629 F.2d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he 180 day rule precludes the proper determi-
nation of the content of a free appropriate public education and accordingly, .. it violates
the Act.")
15. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1976)).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976).
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rights." Such minor steps will serve as markers in the litigation
strategies for the developmentally disabled during the 80s.
I cannot conclude this Introduction without special thanks to
the Arkansas Governor's Developmental Disabilities Planning
Council members and staff whose support made possible both this
Symposium and the conference which preceded it (Conference on
Developmental Disabilities and the Law, October 10-11, 1980) on
which these articles are based. This collective labor testifies to a
hope that through law the promise of a better life, true habilitation
for mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled persons,
may be placed on a surer foundation. For no better measure of the
quality of life in our state or nation can be devised than that assured
to those whose handicapping conditions make them less able to
build a world of their own making.
